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Abstract 
 
Employee computer crime represents a substantial threat for organisations.  Yet 
information security researchers and practitioners currently lack a clear understanding 
of how these crimes are perpetrated, which, as a consequence, hinders security efforts.  
We argue that recent developments in criminology can assist in addressing the insider 
threat.  More specifically, we demonstrate how an approach, entitled Situational 
Crime Prevention, can not only enhance an understanding of employee computer 
crime, but also strengthen security practices which are designed to address this 
problem. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Information security has become increasingly important for organisations, given their 
dependence on ICT.   Not surprisingly, therefore, the external threats posed by 
hackers and viruses have received extensive coverage in the mass-media.  Yet 
numerous security surveys also point to the ‘insider’ threat of employee computer 
crime. In 2006, for example, the Global Security Survey by Deloitte reports that 28% 
of respondent organizations encountered considerable internal computer fraud [5].  
Although this number may not appear high, the impact of crime perpetrated by 
insiders can be profound.  Donn  Parker [6] argues for the need to consider ‘cyber-
criminals’ in terms of their criminal attributes, which include skills, knowledge, 
resources, access and motives (SKRAM).  What makes dishonest employees such a 
devastating threat is often the high quality of these attributes which are gleaned from 
the organisation.  Hence, employees use skills gained through their legitimate work 
duties for illegitimate gain.  Knowledge of security loopholes can be exploited and 
resources and access are provided by companies as a matter of course.  It may even be 
the case that the motive is created by the organisation in the form of employee 
disgruntlement.  Having such a high quality of criminal attributes aids the offender in 
the pursuit of criminal acts, which in the extreme, can bring down an organisation.   
 
Traditionally companies have addressed the insider threat through a workforce who 
are aware of their information security responsibilities, and act accordingly.  Thus, 
security policies and complementary education and awareness programmes are now 
commonplace for organisations.  That said, little progress has been made in 
understanding the insider threat from an offender’s perspective.  With organisations 
attempting to grapple with the behaviour of dishonest employees, would not 
criminology appear to be a useful body of knowledge from which to draw?  We argue 
that Situational Crime Prevention [1], a relative newcomer to criminology, can help 
enhance initiatives aimed at addressing the insider threat.   
 
The next section of this article, discusses how recent criminological developments, 
which focus on the criminal act, represents a departure from traditional criminology 
which examines the causes of criminality.  As part of these ‘recent developments’ we 
discuss Situational Crime Prevention.  After defining this approach we then move on 
to illustrate how it can inform and enhance information security practices. 
 Advances in criminology  
Traditionally, within criminology, considerable efforts have been spent on developing 
‘dispositional’ explanations, which focus on the causes of criminality.  Such 
explanations have been eager to provide accounts of why and how individuals through 
the assimilation of specific social or psychological influences, or the inheritance of 
traits, are as consequence more inclined to criminal behaviour.  In recent years, 
however, a number of criminologists have criticised their discipline for assuming that 
the task of explaining the causes of criminality is the same as explaining the criminal 
act.  Hence, they argue that simply to explain how people develop a criminal 
disposition is only half the equation.  What is further required is an explanation of 
how crimes are perpetrated.  We argue that these criminological approaches, which 
focus on the criminal act, appear to offer more for information security practitioners, 
compared with their dispositional counterparts.  In particular, one approach, entitled 
Situational Crime Prevention, will now be discussed.  It is believed that SCP can offer 
additional tools for practitioners in their fight against insider computer crime.   
 
Situational Crime Prevention Defined 
The catalyst for the development of Situational Crime Prevention was a series of 
studies undertaken by the UK Home Office Research Unit (the British government’s 
criminological research department) in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  These studies 
examined whether the rehabilitation of offenders was a suitable form of crime control.  
Unfortunately, the research cast doubt on the validity of rehabilitation, leading 
workers in the Unit to explore other crime control options.  One such area that 
appeared to offer promise was ironically first noticed during the course of the 
rehabilitation studies of probation hostels and training schools.  Both the hostels and 
schools focussed on youth offenders.  It was noted how the likelihood of individuals 
absconding or re-offending seemed to be dependent more on the type of regime, 
rather than on the youths’ personalities or backgrounds.  It was surmised that if their 
deviant behaviour could be regulated by making changes to certain situational factors, 
there was the further possibility that other forms of crime could be controlled in the 
same manner.  This body of work allowed for a much more dynamic view of crime, 
compared to that advanced by dispositional theories.  Contrary to the latter, criminal 
conduct appeared to be influenced by variations in opportunity, transitory pressures 
and inducements.   
 
From these origins Situational Crime Prevention has emerged.  Hence, differing in its 
focus from most criminology, its starting point is an examination of those 
circumstances which afford specific kinds of crime.  Through an understanding of 
these circumstances, measures are introduced to induce change in the relevant 
environments with the aim of reducing opportunities for crime.  A more formal 
definition of SCP notes how the approach comprises the implementation of 
opportunity reducing techniques that a) target specific forms of crime; b) impact on 
the immediate environment via its design, management, or manipulation, and c) aim 
to either increase the effort and risks of crime, or to render crime less rewarding or 
excusable, or to reduce provocative phenomena in the immediate context [1].  A 
number of points derive from this definition.  As mentioned, SCP’s focus is crime 
specific.  Avoiding a discussion of crime prevention at the level of, for example 
‘burglary’ or ‘robbery’, greater emphasis is placed on those specific crimes which fall 
into these broader categories.  Consequently, preventive measures must be tailored to 
these specific crimes.  So, for example, the preventive measures for tackling the 
burglary of domestic electronic goods, differ from those required to prevent the 
burglary of household cash or jewellery. 
 
The definition of SCP further notes how, in a bid to disrupt the commission of 
specific crimes, safeguards are introduced into the immediate environment.  Such 
actions are designed to impact on the offender’s perceptions of the potential costs and 
benefits of crime commission. The decision to commence and pursue the commission 
of a criminal act would be based on the offender’s favourable evaluation of the 
situation.  The obvious goal, therefore, of those individuals who apply SCP 
techniques, is to implement safeguards to the point where the offender views certain 
crimes in an unfavourable light.   
 
The definition of SCP further notes how as part of the criminal decision making 
process, offenders consider the associated moral costs.  However, in a bid to nullify 
any feelings of guilt associated with a crime, offenders may try to negate such feelings 
through the construction of excuses such as ‘everybody else does it’, ‘they deserve it’ 
etc.  Given this, attempts to stop offenders using such methods may at times prove a 
useful preventive safeguard.  Finally, SCP theorists have further acknowledged how 
the immediate environment may not only afford potential opportunities, but also help 
in provoking criminal behaviour.  Therefore, a number of techniques have been 
developed to mitigate such phenomena. 
 
In attempting to reduce the opportunities for crime, a pivotal role is played, not as 
might be expected, by the criminal justice system, but by a plethora of public and 
private agencies, including manufacturing businesses, schools, local parks, 
entertainment facilities, hospitals, public houses, shopping centres, and the like.  
Hence, many cases can now be cited where preventive measures have been 
successfully implemented.  Examples include surveillance systems for parks and 
underground stations, controls on alcohol at music festivals and sporting fixtures, 
conflict management training for 'bouncers', and street closure/traffic schemes for 
residential neighbourhoods. 
 
The number of techniques advanced by SCP has developed in line with the evolution 
of the approach itself.  Hence the original eight were succeeded by twelve, then 
sixteen, to the position whereby twenty-five techniques are currently proposed.  As 
can be seen in Table 1[4], associated with the techniques are five major aims – 
increase the effort, increase the risks, reduce the rewards, reduce provocation, remove 
excuses - and under each of the aims are listed five techniques for opportunity 
reduction.  Examples of the techniques include target hardening (e.g. anti-robbery 
screens in banks and post offices to increase the effort), reducing anonymity (e.g. taxi 
driver IDs to increase the risks), concealing targets (e.g. unmarked bullion trucks to 
reduce the rewards), avoiding disputes (e.g. reduce crowding in public houses to 
reduce provocation) and the setting of rules (e.g. harassment codes: to remove 
excuses).           
 
Table 1: Twenty –five Techniques of Situational Prevention [4] 
Increase the Effort Increase the Risks Reduce the Rewards Reduce Provocation Remove Excuses 
1. Target harden: 
• Steering column locks and 
immobilisers  
• Anti-robbery screens 
• Tamper-proof packaging 
6. Extend guardianship: 
• Take routine precautions: go out 
in group at night, leave signs of 
occupancy, carry phone 
• “Cocoon” neighbourhood watch 
 
11. Conceal targets: 
• Gender-neutral phone 
directories 
• Unmarked bullion 
trucks 
 
16.Reduce frustrations and 
stress: 
• Efficient queues and polite 
service 
• Expanded seating  
 
21.Set rules: 
• Rental agreements 
• Harassment codes 
• Hotel registration 
 
2. Control access to 
facilities: 
• Entry phones 
• Electronic card access 
• Baggage screening 
 
7. Assist natural surveillance: 
• Improved street lighting 
• Defensible space design  
• Support whistleblowers 
 
12. Remove targets: 
• Removable car radio 
• Women’s refuges 
• Pre-paid cards for pay 
phone 
 
17. Avoid disputes: 
• Separate enclosures for 
rival soccer fans 
• Reduce crowding in pubs 
• Fixed cab fares 
 
22.Post instructions: 
• “No Parking” 
• “Private Property” 
• “Extinguish camp 
fires” 
 
3. Screen exits: 
• Ticket needed for exit 
• Export documents 
• Electronic merchandise tags 
8. Reduce anonymity: 
• Taxi driver IDs 
• “How’s my driving?” decals 
• School uniforms 
 
13.Indentify property: 
• Property making  
• Vehicle licensing and 
parts marking 
• Cattle branding  
 
18.Reduce emotional 
arousal: 
• Controls on violent 
pornography 
• Enforce good behaviour on 
soccer field 
 
23.Alert conscience: 
• Roadside speed 
display boards 
• Signatures for customs 
declarations 
 
4. Deflect offenders: 
• Street closures 
• Separate bathrooms for 
women 
• Disperse pubs 
9. Utilize place managers: 
• CCTV for double-deck buses 
• Two clerks for convenience 
stores 
• Reward vigilance 
 
14.Discrupt markets: 
• Monitor pawn shops 
• Controls on classified 
ads 
• License street vendors 
 
19.Neutralise peer pressure: 
• “Idiots drink and drive” 
• “It’s ok to say No” 
• Disperse troublemakers at 
school 
 
24.Assist compliance: 
• Easy library checkout 
• Public lavatories 
• Litter bins 
 
5. Control tools/weapons: 
• “Smart” guns 
• Disabling stolen cell phones 
• Restrict spray paint sales to 
juveniles 
10. Strengthen formal 
surveillance: 
• Red light cameras 
• Burglar alarms 
• Security guards 
 
15.Deny benefits: 
• Ink merchandise tags 
• Graffiti cleaning  
• Speed humps 
 
20. Discourage imitation: 
• Rapid repair of vandalism 
• V-chips in TVs 
• Censor details of modus 
operandi 
 
25.Control drugs and 
alcohol:  
• Breathalysers in pubs 
• Servers intervention 
• Alcohol-free events 
 
 
Applying Situational Crime Prevention to Information Security 
From an information security perspective, the twenty-five techniques can potentially 
be used by security practitioners for considering safeguard options for influencing the 
offender’s decision making process.  Indeed, many of the techniques advanced by 
SCP are already implicitly used by practitioners.  Obvious examples include screening 
exits (e.g. firewalls), removing targets (e.g. clear desk and screen policies), assisting 
compliance (e.g. single-sign on), target-hardening (e.g. anti-virus detection) and 
controlling tools/weapons (e.g. password management systems).   
 
In terms of safeguards, information security practitioners face the perennial problem 
of deciding which controls should be selected for addressing certain risks.  Yet, this 
problem is also a potential stumbling block for crime prevention practitioners, who 
may have identified the particular crime which needs addressing, but are unsure about 
which controls to use.  In response, the use of crime ‘scripts’ has been proposed [2, 7, 
8, 9].  Originally developed in the field of cognitive science, scripts focus on the 
behavioural processes involved in rational goal-oriented behaviour.  More 
specifically, scripts are able to enhance understanding of specific behaviour in 
specific contexts.  Given this, scripts have been proposed as a useful tool for 
examining criminal behaviour.  In particular the use of what is termed a ‘universal 
script’, has been advanced for helping to correctly identify all the stages in the 
commission process of a crime and the associated criminal behaviour.  Their 
development could be based potentially on input from security practitioners and other 
relevant parties such as departmental staff. 
 
 
Table 2 provides an example of a universal script.  In the first column under the 
heading ‘Scene/Function’ is cited the different elements of the script.  Each element 
can be seen as a stage in the commission process.  In order to more clearly illustrate 
the stages, column two under the heading ‘Script Action’ provides some specific 
content relating to an example of computer crime.  The example is taken from the 
1998 UK Audit Report entitled ‘Ghost in the Machine: An Analysis of IT Fraud and 
Abuse’.  A dishonest local council employee was able to commit computer input 
fraud by using an invoice system.  Although there was a technical segregation – 
different employees had different access to parts of the system via their PCs – security 
vulnerabilities were created due to the fact that the offender’s colleagues failed to 
lock-down their computers.  Waiting until all the other staff had vacated the office, 
the dishonest employee would then access all the PCs in order to process the fraud.   
 
Table 2: Universal Script example 
SCENCE FUNCTION SCRIPT ACTION 
Preparation Deliberately gaining access to the 
organisation 
Entry Already authorised as employee 
Pre-condition Wait for employees absence from offices. 
Instrumental  
Pre-Condition 
Access colleagues’ computers 
Instrumental 
Initiation 
Access programmes 
 
Instrumental 
Actualization 
False customer account construction 
Doing Authorisation of fictitious invoices 
Post Condition Exit programmes 
Exit Exit system 
 
One benefit of developing a script is that it encourages practitioners to consider all the 
stages of crime commission.  In this way, all the criminal behaviour in the process can 
feasibly be identified.  Once this is achieved the next goal is to implement the appropriate 
controls.   
 
To enhance safeguard selection, crime scripts can be merged with the 25 SCP techniques 
[8].  Table 3 provides an example of such a merging based on the example of computer 
crime cited earlier and illustrated in Table 2. Safeguard selection is enhanced as the 
behaviour of the offender has been identified through the development of the crime 
script. In addition, with scripts helping to identify all the stages of the commission 
process and the corresponding criminal actions, this further helps to ensure the optimum 
use of safeguards.  The numbers cited next to each control refer to the type of SCP 
technique (see Table 1).  It is true that no controls are cited under the headings ‘Reduce 
the Rewards’,  ‘Reduce Provocation’ and  ‘Remove Excuses’. To some extent this is to 
be expected given that the techniques have been developed to address a number of 
different crimes in a number of different contexts. However, the merging of the 
techniques, together with crime scripts, provides a systematic schema for practitioners.  
Such a schema could be used as a brainstorming tool for the consideration of other 
controls.    
Table 3 : The Merger of a computer fraud script with the twenty–five Situational Crime Prevention techniques [8] 
Scene function 
 
Script action Increase the Effort Increase the Risks Reduce the 
Rewards 
Reduce Provocation Remove Excuses 
Preparation Deliberately gaining 
access to 
organisation 
Prospective 
employment 
screening (4) 
    
Entry Already authorised as 
employee 
----     
Pre-condition Wait for employees 
absence from offices 
Physical segregation 
of duties (4) 
Staggered breaks (4) 
Signing in/out of 
offices 
(8) 
   
Instrumental 
Pre-condition 
Access colleagues’ 
computers 
System time outs (2) 
Biometric fingerprint 
authentication (2) 
    
Instrumental 
Initiation 
Access programmes Password use for 
access to specific 
programmes (2) 
    
Instrumental 
Actualization 
False customer 
account construction 
 Two person sign-off on 
new accounts (9) 
   
Doing Authorisation of 
fictitious invoices 
 Audit of computer logs 
(8) 
Budget monitoring (8) 
   
Post Condition Exit programmes  ----    
Exit  Exit system  User event viewer (8)    
Doing Later Spend the transferred 
money 
     
Scripts also afford consideration of the interrelationship between the security behaviour 
of staff, safeguards, and the criminal behaviour of dishonest employees.  As employees 
now play a central role in enforcing security, appreciating the interplay between their 
behaviour and controls is of paramount importance.  Password systems are a good 
example of how poor security behaviour (i.e. writing passwords down, sharing them with 
colleagues) of employees can invalidate any protection that such systems were designed 
to offer.  The computer input fraud example also illustrates how, although the technical 
segregation of the system was working properly, the behaviour of fellow members of 
staff left the system vulnerable and open to fraud by the rogue employee.  By considering 
the criminal behaviour at each scene, the requisite controls, and the security actions of 
staff, practitioners can consider more clearly their security options.  One option, for 
example, may be to consider the introduction of redundant controls, which come into 
play when the original safeguard, for whatever reason, does not work properly.  So, for 
example, the ‘Instrumental Pre-condition’ for the fraud involved ‘accessing colleagues’ 
computers’.  As noted, staff members created vulnerabilities by failing to lock down their 
computers.  Practitioners might therefore consider introducing the ‘redundant’ control of 
system time-outs.      
 
Another advantage offered by crime scripts concerns the consideration of the criminal 
attributes required by offenders for perpetration [8].  As noted, Parker [6] argues the need 
to consider ‘cyber-criminals’ in terms of their skill, knowledge, resources, access and 
motives.  This, however, leads to the question of how this should be achieved?  Scripts 
offer a solution to this problem as they are able to place the offender in the criminal 
context.  This is important as is the context which largely dictates and defines criminal 
attributes.  Criminologists who advocate the use of SCP techniques refer to these 
attributes as ‘choice-structuring properties’ [3].  By this, they mean those features of 
criminal activity which make such activity not only available, but also attractive to the 
offender.  In the case of computer crime discussed above, the rogue employee perceived 
criminal activity as ‘available’ given his daily workings with the invoicing system and 
the skills and knowledge that had been acquired as a consequence.  These skills and 
knowledge were complemented by the fact that the offender was aware of the 
vulnerability created through his colleagues failing to lock down their PC’s.  Hence 
practitioners could feasibly elicit the choice-structuring properties through the creation of 
scripts and its ability to afford consideration of the offender in the criminal context.  One 
source of prevention might therefore stem from scrutinising the choice-structuring 
properties and examining methods which deny access to them.  In this sense certain 
criminal activity would be less ‘available’ and ‘attractive’ to potential offenders. 
 
Conclusion 
While there is an obvious need for organizations to address external security threats, the 
problems posed by insider computer crime should not be underestimated.  Unfortunately, 
current research and practice lack a clear understanding of how such crimes are actually 
perpetrated.  In order to obtain such an understanding we argue strongly for the need to 
view computer crime from a criminological perspective.  Common to every crime is the 
role of the offender and with recent developments in criminology, there are not only 
explanations as to the causes of criminality, but also how crime is committed.  Hence we 
have illustrated how SCP can provide insights and tools for understanding and addressing 
the insider threat.  This criminological approach is but one of a number which examine 
the criminal act and provide explanations and practical knowledge about crime 
prevention.  However, unless researchers and practitioners recognise the potential for 
viewing computer crime from a criminological perspective, this knowledge cannot be 
exploited and the benefits will be lost.  
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